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Hatan’s Exemption from Keriat Shema As Presented in Berakhot 16a

Introduction

In a previous Machon Siach essay, “Unpacking the Rabban Gamliel Mishnayot of the Second Half of Mishnah Berakhot 2,” I presented a literary analysis of the last section of the Mishnayot in chapter 2 of Mishnah Berakhot with an eye towards teaching students to see how structure, literary wordplay, and textual patterns help unlock meaning and concepts that Chazal are conveying in the lines and words of the Mishnayot.1

One of the central halakhot that both opens and closes the last section of Mishnayot in that chapter discusses the exemption of the bridegroom, the chatan, from the mitzvah of Keriat Shema (source A below). This paper continues the study of that section of Mishnah and its interpretation of the exemption of the chatan as discussed in the Bavli there.

This paper has several goals. First, we aim to examine the building blocks of the sugya and other relevant sources in rabbinic literature. Identifying the Tannaitic sources will then help us understand the roads that could have been, but were not, taken in the Bavli’s understanding of chatan’s exemption from Keriat Shema. We then can turn to a full appreciation of the Bavli’s read of Hatan’s exemption from Keriat Shema.

Stage 1

Tosefta Berakhot 1:6 (source B) states that a chatan and all others engaged in mitzvot are exempt from the obligation to recite Keriat Shema. The text does not define how long this exemption lasts for. For example, does the exemption of a chatan last just the first night of marriage, the whole first day of marriage, or the entire week of sheva berakhot. Moreover, the Tosefta does not address the relationship between the exemption of chatan and those “engaged in mitzvot,” implying at first blush that the chatan is not engaged in a mitzvah but is exempt for some other reason. It is important to note that this Tosefta (as well as our Mishnah) does not explicitly mention the general concept of nor use the nomenclature of עוסק במצווה פטור מן המצווה which is found in a number of sugyot in the Bavli. In fact, the term and concept laying out a general exemption from performing one positive commandment if one is already engaged in another one, is not used here, nor in any Tannaitic or early Amoraic source. It is only introduced explicitly in the anonymous strata of the Gemara known as the stama.2 Reading the Tosefta then, one could simply interpret it as a special law relating exclusively to Keriat Shema and Tefillah. The rationale could simply be that one who is engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from Keriat Shema and Tefillah because the concept of beshivtekhah beveitekha implies integrating kabbalat ol malkhut shamayim into one’s regular life schedule. At the time one is engaged in heavenly service of performing a mitzvah there is no need to make a special declaration of fealty to God. A chatan is exempt because he is not in his normal routine and cannot go about his daily life routines – “belechtekha baderech.” This is not because he is engaged in a formal mitzvah at this second but rather because of his status as a chatan who cannot go about his regular life. He is obligated to be with his wife and “gladden her.” Secondly, one can take another direction, that also sees this as an independent exemption. It may be that the chatan cannot be on the derekh, because he is supposed to be at home; he may not leave his home – a kind of intense sense of not going back into the regular world. This reading is explicitly adopted by R. Sherira Gaon in his comments to the Talmudic passage:

בשעה שאתה יכול להלך בדרך חייב אתה בקריית שמע ובשעה שאינך יכול להלך בדרך בזמן שאתה חתן.

At the time when you are capable of walking on the way, you are obligated in Keriat Shema. And at a time when you are incapable of walking on the way, such as when you are a groom.3

In this reading, the exemption of the chatan has nothing to do with the level of concentration and intent he must have but because of a more independent exemption. This reading would be supported as the law of the chatan in the Tosefta appears in the first chapter and not in the second chapter when the Tosefta and Mishnah begin to discuss the issue of kavanah!4

The notion that Keriat Shema should be integrated into one’s regular life is fully developed in the writings of Rav Shagar on Berakhot. He points to Beit Hillel’s formulations throughout Masekhet Berakhot that Keriat Shema should be done Kedarko – when the individual is engaging in his or her normal life. Indeed, Berakhot 11a cites the view from Beit Hillel that one may recite Keriat Shema while continuing to work (a statement that is later modified and limited in the Amoraic discussion on Berakhot 16a).

Rav Shagar writes5:

At the core of the words of Beit Hillel is the notion that the mitzvah of Keriat Shema exists as part of daily life, as part of regular activity; here we see that when regular activity is suspended, the obligation of Keriat Shema dissipates. The chatan is categorized as someone who is not in a regular existence, and thus is not considered “going on his way” and obligated in Keriat Shema (translation is my own).

Stage 2

Turning to our Mishnah, a source parallel to the Tosefta, a subtle shift has occurred. No longer do we have the ambiguous “chatan patur” of the Tosefta but rather “chatan patur miKeriat Shema baleila harishon im lo asa maaseh.” We have moved away from the question of the status of the chatan to the actions of the chatan, bringing us much closer to the realm of a conflict between two mitzvot, rather than an exemption due to his particular status.

This subtle shift in the Mishnah may be a rejection of the notion that the chatan should remain in his home, or it may represent a separate tradition as to the law that emphasized the mitzvah action rather than the status of the chatan. Either way, this shift yields the sea change picked up on by the Bavli.

Stage 3

The Bavli (source C) immediately cites the Tosefta we began with, but once again adds a line that is missing from the original source:

הכונס את בתולה פטור ואת האלמנה חייב.

One who marries a virgin is exempt [from Keriat Shema], but one who marries a widow is obligated.6

In line with the Mishnah’s introduction of the issue of the first night and the marital act of conjugal relations (מעשה) the Bavli’s version of the beraita introduces a further distinction between having marital relations (הכונס) with a virgin in which the chatan is exempt and that with a widow who was previously married. This line is not found in the original Tosefta and thus reflects the Bavli’s aligning the Tosefta source with our Mishnah. Once the Mishnah had introduced the focus on the conjugal act, an immediate question must surely arise in reading the Tannaitic drasha recorded in the Tosefta’s version of beraita cited by the Bavli. What is the difference between the general exemption of those engaged in a mitzvah based on the drasha of בשכבך ובקומך- פרט לעסוקין במצות and the exemptions of a chatan based on the drasha of בלכתך בדרך- פרט לחתן? If we are discussing the conjugal act of marriage isn’t that already included in the original drasha and exemption? Isn’t the mitzvah act of marital relations in the category of עסוקין במצוות?

Perhaps one must interpret the second drasha as not focused on the conjugal act itself but on some new category that while not relating broadly to the status of the chatan (as in the reading of the Tosefta) is somehow related to the marital act in some way. It is here that the Bavli innovates a new concept entitled טירדא דמצווה as a general category of exemption.7 The mental and emotional ability of someone to have proper intent in Keriat Shema when worried about what awaits him as he is coming to the first night of marriage is an instance of טירדא דמצווה. This is nicely summarized in the words of Rashi at the top of Berakhot 11a who writes (s.v. ובלכתך בדרך פרט לחתן):

ואע”ג דחתן נמי עוסק במצוה הוא אי לאו קרא יתירה לא נפקא לן מקרא קמא דכיון דעוסק במצוה לא כתיב בקרא בהדיא אלא מיעוטא בעלמא הוא דקא דרשינן מביתך וממעטינן מינה עוסק במלאכת מצוה דאיכא טרדא. אבל חתן דטרדא דמחשבה בעלמא הוא שמחשב על עסק בתולים אי לאו קרא יתירה לא אתמעוט.

Even though a groom is also engaged in a mitzvah, if not for the additional verse, we could not have derived his exemption from the first verse. This is because when one is engaged in a mitzvah, the Torah does not explicitly state this exemption in the verse; it is only derived indirectly through the interpretation of “from your house,” This excludes one who is engaged in the labor of a mitzvah, as such a person is preoccupied. However, a groom, whose preoccupation is solely mental — as he is thinking about matters related to his impending consummation of the marriage — would not have been excluded without the additional verse.

Stage 4

In this reading it emerges that our simple drasha that began as a small one related exclusively to Keriat Shemaבשכבך פרט לעסוקים במצוות – becomes the source of the more general concept of עוסק במצווה פטור מן המצווה and the drasha of,ובלכתך בדרך פרט לחתן becomes a source for a general exemption of טירדא דמצווה in the entire range of the world of mitzvot. Indeed, when we turn to Bavli Sukkot 25a (source D) one view for the source for עוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה is explicitly stated as our verse and drasha.8

Stage 5:

Once we have reached this stage in understanding the sugya, the door is now left wide open for the analytical questions of classical lamdanut to come to the fore. Thus questions that can be examined include the final relationship between the two drashot in the Bavli’s reading; Does the exemption of chatan because of טירדא דמצווה now become a subset of the general concept of עוסק במצווה פטור מן המצווה and follow its rules or is it a separate halakha that marches to its own rules and regulations, and is more limited or possibly expansive in scope.9

Conclusion:

In this short paper we examined the structure of the last section of the Mishnayot in Berakhot chapter 2, including what seemed like entirely tangential halakhot not related to the theme of the perek: Keriat Shema and its proper recitation. Our careful reading and literary analysis helped us understand the meaning of the Mishnayot and their placement at the close of the perek. This led us to then more deeply examine the key Keriat Shema issue discussed in these mishanyot, i.e. the obligation of a chatan in Keriat Shema. We began with the Tosefta in chapter 1 and saw how this text could be interpreted in its own light and how the Mishna and the Bavli subsequently took it in a different direction. In the end our study helped us understand the Bavli’s move to expand the category that emerges from our Mishnayot to yield more broad principles about exemptions from mitzvot when engaging in religious behavior.10

Talmudic Texts Examined in this Paper

משנה ברכות פרק ב: ה ח .A

ב,ה : חתן פטור מקרית שמע בלילה הראשון ועד מוצאי שבת אם לא עשה מעשה.  מעשה ברבן גמליאל שנשא וקרא בלילה הראשון שנשא.  אמרו לו לא לימדתנו שחתן פטור מקרית שמע בלילה הראשון.  אמר להם איני שומע לכם לבטל ממני מלכות שמיים אפילו שעה אחת.

ב,ח : חתן–אם רצה לקרות את שמע בלילה הראשון קורא.  רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר לא כל הרוצה ליטול את השם ייטול.

תוספתא ברכות פרק א:ו (מהודרת ליברמן) .B

החתנים וכל העסוקין במצות פטורין מן קרית שמע ומן התפלה שנ’ בשבתך בביתך פרט לעסוקים במצות ובלכתך בדרך פרט לחתנים.

בבלי ברכות דף טז .C

חתן פטור מק”ש:

  1. תנו רבנן “:(על דברים ו,ז׳ (בשבתך בביתך’ – פרט לעוסק במצוה; ‘ובלכתך בדרך’ – פרט לחתן;
  2. מכאן אמרו: הכונס את הבתולה – פטור, ואת האלמנה – חייב”
  3. מאי משמע? אמר רב פפא: כי דרך ; מה דרך רשות – אף הכא נמי רשות .
  4. מי לא עסקינן דקאזיל לדבר מצוה ואפילו הכי אמר רחמנא ליקרי ?
  5. אם כן לימא קרא ‘בלכת’; מאי ‘בלכתך’? שמע מינה בלכת דידך – הוא דמחייבת, הא דמצוה – פטירת
  6. אי הכי, מאי איריא הכונס את הבתולה? אפילו כונס את האלמנה נמי ?
  7. הכא טריד והכא לא טריד.
  8. אי משום טירדא – אפילו טבעה ספינתו בים נמי? אלמה אמר רבי אבא בר זבדא אמר רב: ‘אבל חייב בכל
  9. מצוות האמורות בתורה חוץ מן התפילין שהרי נאמר בהן פאר, שנאמר (יחזקאל כד יז): [האנק דם
  10. מתים אבל לא תעשה] “פארך חבוש עליך” [ונעליך תשים ברגליך ולא תעטה על שפם ולחם אנשים לא תאכל?
  11. אמרי: התם טירדא דרשות, הכא טירדא דמצוה.

סוכה כה. .D

מתני’ שלוחי מצוה פטורין מן הסוכה חולין ומשמשיהן פטורין מן הסוכה אוכלין ושותין עראי חוץ לסוכה:
גמ’ מה”מ ?דת”ר (דברים ו, ז) בשבתך בביתך פרט לעוסק במצוה ובלכתך בדרך פרט לחתן מכאן אמרו הכונס את הבתולה פטור ואת האלמנה חייב מאי משמע אמר רב הונא כדרך מה דרך רשות אף כל רשות לאפוקי האי דבמצוה עסוק …(שאר הסוגיא ציטוט ישיר מברכות דף טז)
והעוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה מהכא נפקא?, מהתם נפקא דתניא (במדבר ט, ו) ויהי אנשים אשר היו טמאים לנפש אדם וגו’ אותם אנשים מי היו נושאי ארונו של יוסף היו דברי ר’ יוסי הגלילי וכו׳ וכו׳

Footnotes

  1. Accessible at the here on the website.
  2. For a full discussion of this see Menachem Katz, “Ha’osek bemitzvah pasture min hamitzvah,” Mishlav 40, (Summer 2006): 57-86.
  3. See Otzar Hage’onim, Berakhot, 24, as well as Saul Leiberman, Tosefet Rishonim, (JTS, 1999) vol. 2, 28.
  4. Tosefta Berakhot 2:9 that states:

    השושבינין וכל בני החופה פטורין מן התפלה ומן התפילין כל שבעת הימים וחייבין בק”ש רבי שילא אומר חתן פטור וכל בני החבורה חייבין.

    However, as Saul Lieberman notes in his comments in Tosefta Kefshutah, it is clear that this Tosefta is not discussing the issue that is found in chapter 1 and the exemption of chatan from Keriat Shema. The text discusses the entire groom’s party and specifically speaks of all seven days. The issue here is the drinking and merriment that may get out of hand during the week of sheva berakhot which would hamper the ability to concentrate and have a serious mental state for Keriat Shema and prayer.

  5. Rav Shagar, Shiurim Be-Gemara: Berakhot, Vol. 1 (Makhon Kitvei HaRav Shagar, 2020), 68. See also pages 27-30 and 62-67. In a similar vein see the excellent formulation of Dr. Avi Walfish regarding the permission to interrupt Keriat Shema to greet someone out of fear or honor at the opening of Berakhot chapter 2. Wlafish writes, “According to Beit Hillel, ‘on the way’ obligates a person to integrate his acceptance of the kingdom of heaven into the flow of his life, and therefore our Mishnah obligates the workman to recite Keriat Shema without removing himself from the framework of his work and from his obligation to his employer. Similarly, one might argue that Keriat Shema must not sever a person from the social frameworks of respect and fear in which he is obligated, and therefore he is permitted to briefly interrupt his Keriat Shema in order to give expression to these obligations.” Avie Walfish for the Drisha Mishna Project, accessed on July 13, 2022. The website has been reorganized and Rabbi Dr. Walfish’s writings on Mishnah Berakhot are no longer available there
  6. The root of the distinction may be that in the case of a virgin the man may be concerned that he may injure himself or wife when he attempts to penetrate the hymen. Alternatively, and this is the dominant reading in the Rishonim, it may relate to the man’s concern that he may find that the woman whom he married and believed was a virgin may not be so. This would lead to court proceedings as outlined in the opening sugya in Ketubot 2a.
  7. It is clear from the rest of the sugya in the Bavli that this concept is understood to be part of the general concept of exemption from a mitzvah while engaged in another mitzvah, not just for exemption from Keriat Shema
  8. See the first half of Menachem Katz, “Ha’osek bemitzvah.”
  9. See for example the discussion in Eliyahu Meir Lifshitz, “Sugya 39: Din Chatan beKeriat Shema,” in Torat Imekha, Berakhot. Accessed July 14, 2022.
  10. This move may be reflective of a general attitude in this chapter to situate the mitzvah of Keriat Shema and the kavanah necessary in the more general rubric of mitzvot and kavanah in general. See for example the opening sugya in the perek which immediately tries to connect the first words of the first perek requiring kavanah to the general debate about מצוות צריכות כוונה throughout the Talmud.

Rabbi Nathaniel Helfgot

Rabbi Helfgot is chair of the Department of Torah SheBaal Peh at SAR High School, serves as Rabbi of Congregation Netivot Shalom in Teaneck, and is an adjunct faculty member at Yeshivat Chovevei Torah. He taught for many years at the Drisha Institute for Jewish Education as well as serving on the faculty of the Wexner Heritage Program.

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