Martyrdom, Lineage, and Family: Rabbeinu Tam and the Grand Conversation

One of the most meaningful aspects of learning Gemara as I prepare to teach in the classroom occurs when I encounter an opinion or perspective that significantly challenges our common sensibilities. At times, we are challenged to understand the logic or interpretive strategy embedded in a statement of the Gemara. Sometimes, the text or opinion appears to diverge from our accepted values or moral norms. When this occurs, the teacher must make a decision. I can choose to teach the challenging text or to skip it. If I decide to teach the text, I have a further decision to make. Do I simply accept the dissonance and attribute it to the fact that the Tanna, Amora, or Rishon simply lived in a different time and place while I continue to maintain the legitimacy of my current mindset? Do I assume a certain sanctity, a truth in that particular opinion that I am simply unable to cognitively access in our contemporary time? These compartmentalization strategies allow me to accept the validity of the new opinion as well as the validity of my own assumption without needing to do much work to respond to the challenge. Alternatively, I can adjust my own ethics and moral values to conform to my intuitive understanding of the text. The Torah is, after all, my guide as a Jew. There is a fourth option: we can commit to doing our best to “make sense” of the difficult text, investing the time to draw on parallels, commentary, and current analogous cases in order to bring contemporary meaning to the difficult text. This is a version of what, at SAR High School, we refer to as the Grand Conversation. It is an integrative strategy requiring time, patience, research, and a form of conceptual translation that helps make concepts meaningful across centuries and continents.

On many occasions in my learning, I have opted for one of the first three options. Over time, I have become deeply committed to giving the necessary time and energy to the fourth option, to making the challenging text more accessible for our high school classroom learning. I believe in this for two reasons. First, in doing so, our values and expectations are challenged. When we invest the time and energy to bridge the cultural gap reflected in the text, we can successfully uncover the issues and assumptions that drive the unexpected opinion. We are then exposed, through our Torah learning, to different social and religious values. We have the opportunity to see familiar texts and concepts in a new light. This is deep learning. Second, in working through this process with our students, we teach them that learning difficult and challenging texts can, rather than frustrate them, be an interesting and enlightening experience. Through the interpretive process, students discover that a seemingly distant text can carry meaning for today’s learner. The reader draws contemporary meaning from the text through the interpretive act. This plurality of meaning that the text carries and the role of interpretation in bridging past and present is precisely what makes it eternally meaningful or, as Frank Kermode describes, a classic.

The View of Rabbeinu Tam
I experienced an example of this when teaching the eighth chapter of Sanhedrin. The Talmud (Sanhedrin 74a) teaches that a Jew is obligated to surrender one’s life to sanctify, and avoid the public desecration of, the name of God. The Gemara notes that the biblical story of Esther presents a challenge to this idea. Esther married a non-Jew, Achashverosh. This was a matter of public knowledge and thus a Chilul Hashem, a desecration of God’s name which violates the positive commandment of “ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל” (Vayikra 22:32) and the negative commandment of “ולא תחללו את שם קדשי” (Vayikra 22:32)!¹ Rambam, Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah 5:1. Abaye and Rava each offer a response as to why Esther was permitted to be with Achashverosh and her actions not considered a Chilul Hashem.

Tosafot is troubled by the Talmud’s question: why does the text focus on Chilul Hashem, the public nature of the violation? Even as a private act, Esther’s marriage to Achashverosh violated gilui arayot, illicit sex, one of the three cardinal prohibitions for which one must surrender one’s life rather than transgress. Tosafot presents two answers to this question, the first in the name of Rabbeinu Tam (RT).

ותירץ ר”ת דאין חייבין מיתה על בעילת עובד כוכבים משום דרחמנא אפקריה לזרעיה דעובד כוכבים כדאמרינן בפ’ נושאין על האנוסה (יבמות צח.) דכתיב וזרמת סוסים זרמתם.

And RT answered that a woman does not receive the death penalty for adultery with a non-Jewish man because the Torah dispossesses the seed of the Gentile…(Yevamot 98a) as is stated “whose flow is the flow of horses” (Yechezkel 23:20).

RT proposes that the sugya asks only about the public desecration of God’s name and not about the violation of giluy arayot because in fact while sexual intercourse with a non-Jewish man is prohibited it is not a capital violation because the Torah “dispossesses” the seed of a non-Jewish man. RT cites Yevamot 98a which states that the child of a non-Jewish man is not considered his lineage citing the verse “וזרמת סוסים זרמתם,” comparing the “flow” of a non-Jew to that of a horse. Tosafot further informs us that RT relied on this textual interpretation to permit a married Jewish woman who had committed adultery with a non-Jewish man to subsequently marry that same man after her first marriage ended and her adulterer converted to Judaism. In cases where all the parties to an adulterous affair are Jewish the woman is prohibited to both her husband and the adulterous man (אחד לבעל ואחד לבועל). In this instance since the initial act was not considered a capital violation of adultery there is no prohibition against their subsequent marriage.

Anticipating Students’ Questions
RT’s explanation, as well as the Talmudic interpretation upon which he bases his view, are challenging for the contemporary reader. The seed of non-Jewish men is compared to the seed of a horse. What is the meaning of this analogy? We should certainly attempt to understand the verse in its context in Yechezkel. Even so, we must explain its application by RT to the case of the adulterous affair. When preparing to teach this Tosafot to modern, halakhically observant high school students, especially in a co-ed class, a teacher can anticipate the discomfort when students read this view of RT. While a veteran of the beit midrash might be more familiar with this idea and able to move through it, our students will find it jarring. Students might easily conclude that, given the comparison to animals, RT believes that non-Jews do not have the same status as Jews and are “less than” Jewish people in some respect. The high school teacher must decide in advance whether to quickly move through this section and focus more deeply on the second view – that of Rivam – or to work to achieve an accessible understanding of RT’s view and translate it for our contemporary classroom. The dissonant experience can be taken as an opportunity to dig deeper. Sometimes, although not always, when we work through the tension, we can uncover new meaning.

The goal in such work is to identify an interpretation that I believe in and through which I can successfully convey religious or social meaning to my students. While there are often many approaches one can adopt, the interpretation that I ultimately decide to teach must make enough sense to me that I can stand behind it in explaining it to my students. Because we learn with our students in mind, ultimately the teacher must ask: should I teach this text to this particular group of students at this time? If so, how can I best teach this in a way in which my students can understand and appreciate rather than experience as dissonant? This approach does not require the interpretation to be agreeable to students. It does demand that I make it logically and ethically accessible to our students.²The present paper should be read with these goals in mind. The essays in this volume, for example, are not designed as classic chiddushei Torah. There is also no claim of comprehensiveness. The purpose of this writing is to highlight a small text of the Gemara, highlight the anticipated content-related questions that will be raised by our students, and suggest our best path for teaching that text, using Rishonim, Lomdus, and academic resources to accomplish that task.

Granting the potential visceral or emotional response of students to RT’s view, we must take the time to parse the sentences that comprise RT’s view in order to fully comprehend his idea. One set of questions centers on the Talmud’s idea in Sanhedrin that serves as the basis for RT’s application of the dispossession of the non-Jew’s seed to the question of the capital violation of adultery. The former is derived from a Gemara that declares that a non-Jewish man does not have a familial bond with his son born from a Jewish woman. How might we explain the relationship between family lineage (in Yevamot) and the severity of sexual transgression (in Sanhedrin)? How does RT derive that sex with a non-Jew is not a capital violation from the fact that the non-Jew’s lineage does not carry forward to his converted child?³ See Rabbi Herschel (Tzvi) Schachter, Eretz Hatzevi (Genesis Jerusalem Press, 1992), 114.

Furthermore, while the Gemara’s comparison (in Yevamot 98a) of the seed of a non-Jewish man to the seed of a horse might be useful in the discussion about lineage, yichus, it is not clearly comparable to our sugya regarding sexual transgression. After all, sex with an animal is itself in the list of arayot described twice in Vayikra! Should it not also be included in the list of yehareig ve’al ya’avor? Given that, how does the comparison generate the leniency regarding adultery with a non-Jew?

What did RT mean?
The first task is for me to study the text and relevant resources in an effort to uncover a path that I feel comfortable with and committed to; an interpretation that, to me, satisfies the need to reasonably explain RT’s view. This section of the paper reflects some of that learning process. It includes sources from which to draw understanding and then select a possible path of understanding. The decision as to which content to teach in the classroom, if any, comes later.

The version of RT cited in Sanhedrin does not offer an explanation for his view. However, other Rishonim elaborate on RT, adding a phrase of explanation for RT’s opinion. Rabbeinu Asher (Rosh)⁴ Rabbeinu Asher, Ketuvot 1:4. cites RT as follows:

ותירץ ר”ת דאינה מחויבת למסור עצמה למיתה על ביאת עובד כוכבים דרחמנא אפקריה לזרעיה דעובד כוכבים דכתיב וזרמת סוסים זרמתם ולא מקריא ביאה.

And RT answered that a woman does not resign herself to death for adultery with a non-Jewish man because the Torah dispossesses the seed of the Gentile as is stated “whose flow is the flow of horses” (Yechezkel 23:20),and that is not called intercourse.

After citing RT, Rosh adds “and that is not called intercourse,” suggesting that the Gemara’s use of the analogy in Yechezkel teaches that sex with a non-Jewish man does not have the status of sexual intercourse, at least as it relates to capital offenses. What might we mean in saying that this sexual act is “not called sex”? Considered from the teacher’s perspective, we must work to explicate this idea in a manner that students can understand in order to bring it to the classroom.⁵It is possible to explain that this act simply does not carry halakhic standing. If this is so in the subsequent case cited by RT regarding the non Jewish adulterer who now converted to Judaism the woman should be permitted to return to her current husband or to marry the non-Jew after conversion. This suggestion is complicated by the fact that the very same paragraph in the Shitah Mekubetzet notes that while the act is not considered intercourse regarding the non-Jew the woman herself is nonetheless prohibited from returning to her husband after relations with the non-Jew. This suggests that an illicit sexual act did indeed take place! Note the variations in the two Tosafot as well as the Rosh: דלא שייך למימר אחד לבעל ואחד לבועל (Tosafot Ketuvot Rosh) versus דלא שייך למימר אחד לבועל (Tosafot Sanhedrin Shitah Mekubetzet Ketuvot 3b). In Eretz Hatzvi p. 114 note 6 Rav Schachter distinguishes between a ma’aseh bi’ah an act of intercourse and a ma’aseh ishut a marital act. Sex with a non-Jewish man does not carry the status of halakhic intercourse but does carry the status of a marital act. Therefore the woman is prohibited to her husband but is not prohibited to a non-Jewish man should he convert because the act does not qualify as adultery. Students (and many adults) will not grasp the distinction between ma’aseh bi’ah and ma’aseh ishut without some effort on the teacher’s part to translate those concepts into more accessible terms. In the explanation below I suggest that adultery and mamzerut are not the result of illicit sex alone but of illicit sex that tampers with the Jewish structure of marriage and family. Following that reasoning one could use the terms in the reverse fashion. Sex with a non-Jewish man is a ma’aseh bi’ah but is not a ma’aseh ishut since marriage with a non-Jewish man is not possible. Since it is precisely a problematic ma’aseh ishut that generates arayot and mamzerut that does not apply regarding the non-Jew. However the adulteress is prohibited to her husband after relations with a non-Jewish man because it is considered a ma’aseh bi’ah and a lack of fidelity to her husband. See below

Tosafot (Ketuvot 3b) cites the same RT but adds a different phrase of explanation:

ותירץ ר”ת דאין חייבין מיתה על בעילת מצרי דרחמנא אפקריה לזרעיה דמצרי דכתיב (יחזקאל כג) וזרמת סוסים זרמתם. ומייתי ראיה דפריך בפ’ בן סורר ומורה (שם:) הא אסתר פרהסיא הואי ולא פריך והא אסתר גילוי עריות הויא משמע דמשום עריות לא הוה מיחייבא.

And RT answered that one does not receive the death penalty for cohabitation with a non-Jew, because the Torah dispossesses the seed of non-Jews, as it is written, “Their flow is the flow of horses” (Ezekiel 23:20). He brings proof from the question in the chapter Ben Sorer Umoreh (Sanhedrin 74b), where it asks, “But Esther was in public view,” and it does not ask, “But Esther was in a case of giluy arayot, which implies that it was not considered a transgression of arayot.

Tosafot explains RT as saying that the analogy from Yevamot implies that sex with a non-Jewish man is not considered a transgression of arayot. It appears that this Tosafot is suggesting a different explanation than that of the Rosh. Why might sex with a non-Jewish man not come under the category of the arayot prohibitions? As a teacher, I will focus on Tosafot’s (Ketuvot 3b) understanding of RT, the view that I can more clearly explain.   

Why are the arayot so severe?
The earlier questions and the language of the Tosafot push us to step back and clarify the possible reasons for the requirement to give up one’s life for arayot violations. While it is clear to all who have spent some time learning Gemara that one must martyr oneself rather than violate the arayot (and idolatry and murder), we sometimes assume the severity of the violation without exploring the possible reasons for the stringency. I imagine that most students (and adults) conclude that martyrdom is required because sexual transgression is very severe in general, with adulterous and incestuous sex being the most significant transgressions. In Judaism, sex is both positive and dangerous. Giving in to one’s sexual drive at the wrong times can cause irreparable damage. However, that rationale does not precisely explain the nuanced interpretations of the Rishonim. We must carefully tease out the possible reasons for the arayot prohibitions. Through doing so, we can better understand why certain sexual transgressions require the ultimate sacrifice while others are excluded from that obligation.

Clearly, not all sexual transgression is the same. Premarital sex, for example, is a sexual transgression; it is not arayot. Within the category of arayot, there are several possible conceptualizations for what constitutes these transgressions. Through this analysis, we will discover that RT’s interpretation is grounded in a particular understanding of the arayot prohibitions and their relationship to Jewish marriage. We will begin with an alternative to RT which, through comparison, can help us access RT’s view.

The Ran (Sanhedrin 74a) highlights two possible frameworks for the prohibition of arayot.⁶The text of Chiddushei HaRan:
חוץ מע״א וג״ע וש״ד. לפי שאלו העבירות הם חמורות מכולן אמרו חכמים יהרג ואל יעבור. עבודת אלילים טעמא מבואר שלא יכפור בהקב״ה. ושפיכת דמים ג״כ שלא יציל עצמו בממון של חבירו. גילוי עריות נמי מפני שיש בהם פגם שהרי מצילין אותה בנפשו ואם כן בדין הוא שיהרג ואל יעבור. ולפי טעם זה אם יאמרו לו בא על בהמה או תיהרג כיון שאין שם פגם יעבור ואל יהרג שהרי למדו כל עריות מנערה המאורסה להצילן בנפשן ואין הבהמה בכלל ואין צריך לומר חייבי לאווין כאלמנה לכהן גדול. אבל אין לנו לחדש דין זה שלא פירשוהו חכמים ועוד שאין טעם יהרג ואל יעבור מפני שמצילין אותן בנפשן דהרי ע״א קיימא לן דאין מצילין אותו בנפשו ויהרג ואל יעבור ולפיכך אפשר דאפילו בא על בהמה אמרינן יהרג ואל יעבור כיון שיש בה מיתת בית דין. The first interpretation focuses on sexual transgression broadly defined, while the second interpretation is an outgrowth of the laws of rodef which conveys the responsibility of a bystander to stop the pursuer. In the first conception, all capital sexual sins recorded in the arayot sections of the Torah require surrendering one’s life. According to this logic, certain cases of illicit sex (the capital cases) are so morally and halakhically problematic that one must martyr oneself rather than violate the law. Alternatively, the idea of giving up one’s own life is rooted not in sexual sin per se but in the obligation to save the pursued. If a person is obligated to kill a pursuer to prevent certain actions, that same person is obligated to give up one’s own life rather than commit that act.⁷ The Ran attempts to delineate the parameters of martyring oneself and expresses uncertainty regarding the transgression of bestiality. On the one hand bestiality is included in the list of sexual prohibitions in Vayikra. And yet suggests the Ran perhaps just as one may not kill a perpetrator to prevent him from violating bestiality (אין מצילין אותן בנפשן) perhaps there is also no obligation to surrender one’s own life for this type of sexual line crossing. While the Ran chooses to be stringent on this question he does acknowledge the possibility that not all capital sexual transgressions listed in Vayikra are in the category of arayot for which one must martyr themselves. He entertains the possibility that the obligation to give one’s life is related to the obligation to take the life of a pursuer and save the pursued in similar circumstances establishing the rule as an extension of the rodef principle. This possibility decouples sexual transgression from arayot. Not all sexual sin is arayot. Bestiality serves as a test case for the Ran to help distinguish these two rationales. Bestiality is included in the arayot unit and yet a man is not considered to be a rodef who must be stopped when pursuing an animal. According to the first option, one would be required to give up one’s life rather than commit bestiality. The arayot rule is not associated with the rodef rule. They derive from entirely separate principles. According to the second option, which associates adultery with the rodef rule, bestiality does not require martyrdom.⁸See Even Yisrael on the Rambam Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah 5: ונראה לומר דהנה יש לעיין בעיקר דינא דיהרג ואל יעבור בהני ג’ עבירות. אי הוא חיובא גם להרוג את עצמו קודם שיעבור או דנימא דהוא חיובא להניח להרוג את עצמו ע”י העכו”ם אבל עליו בעצמו אין חיוב להרוג את עצמו ופשוט דזה תלוי בעיקר יסוד חיובא דיהרג ואל יעבור דעי’ בחידושי הר”נ בסנהדרין דף ע”ד כתב וז”ל חוץ מע”א וג”ע ושפיכות דמים לפי שאלו העבירות הן חמורות מכלם אמרו חכמים יהרג ואל יעבור ע”ז טעמא מבואר שלא יכפור בהקב”ה. ושפיכות דמים ג”כ שלא יציל נפשו בדמו של חבירו ג”ע נמי מפני שיש בהם פגם שהרי מצילין אותה בנפשו וא”כ בדין הוא שיהרג ואל יעבור ולפי טעם זה אם יאמר לו בא על הבהמה או תיהרג כיון שאין שם פגם יעבור ואל יהרג שהרי למדו כל העריות מנערה המאורסה להצילן בנפשו ואין הבהמה בכלל וכו’ אבל אין לנו לחדש דין זה שלא פרשוהו חכמים ועוד שאין טעם יהרג ואל יעבור מפני שמצילין אותן בנפשו דהרי ע”ז קיי”ל דאין מצילין אותן בנפשו ויהרג ואל יעבור ולפיכך אפשר דאפי’ בא על הבהמה אמרינן יהרג ואל יעבור כיון שיש בה מיתת ב”ד וכו’ עיי”ש הרי מבואר בר”נ דיש לפרש דכל דינא דיהרג ואל יעבור הוא משום דינא דמצילין אותו בנפשו ועי’ מנחת חינוך מצוה רצ”ו שכתב דבאנסוהו להרוג חבירו נתן להצילו בנפשו וכל ישראל הרואה ויכול להציל את חבירו בנפשו מחויב להציל ולהרוג אותו אף שאינו חייב מיתה על ההריגה היינו לאחר שהרג אבל קודם שהרג הוי רודף עיי”ש. והנפ”מ הוא אם אונסין אותו לבוא על הבהמה אי אית בי’ דינא דיהרג ואל יעבור.
From a conceptual and values perspective, these two views offer dramatically different reasons for the requirement to martyr oneself rather than violate the arayot prohibitions. The first opinion requires us to avoid severe sexual sin because of its inherent severity. According to the second opinion, the obligation to martyr oneself derives from the obligation to prevent harm to others that can be caused by sexual transgression as well as other types of violence. The formulations of the Ran push us to be more precise as to why and under what circumstances a person is obligated to surrender one’s life rather than sexually transgress. This, in turn, helps us take an initial step in understanding a third view, the position of Rabbeinu Tam.

The Ran’s use of bestiality as a test case might shed light on RT’s comparison between the non-Jew and the animal. Perhaps RT adopts the lenient view on the Ran’s question and therefore one is not obligated to surrender one’s life for bestiality but for a different reason than that suggested by the Ran. According to RT, the yehareig ve’al ya’avor rules are not rooted in the immorality of illicit sex per se (if so, how could bestiality be excluded?) but are rather driven by another value – one that could explain why a case such as bestiality might be a capital crime and yet not be included in the requirement to martyr oneself.

Sexual transgression and the Jewish family
In order to unpack RT’s view, we must engage the sugya in Yevamot from which RT’s interpretation derives. While the specific cases across Masekhet Yevamot are notoriously complex, one can broadly state that the various sugyot explore and shape the contours and borders of the Jewish family.

In this particular sugya, the Talmud discusses the status of converts and the children of converts as they relate to the laws of levirate marriage. Yevamot 97b cites the case of twin brothers who converted and married Jewish women. If one brother dies, there is no obligation of yibum because they are not considered siblings from a halakhic perspective. Rava explains that the beraita selected a case of twins in order to dispel the notion that this rule is rooted in the alleged promiscuity of non-Jews (in which case we cannot determine paternity with certitude). In the case of twins, the children clearly share a father and yet, halakhically, they do not have the status of brothers. Rava derives this principle from the abovementioned verse in Yechezkel 23. Halakha does not consider the non-Jewish man to be the father of the children. In other words, Rava draws on analogy of the verse to make a comment regarding paternity and family status. The parents and twins in this situation do not comprise a Jewish family. Therefore, from a halakhic vantage point, these two men do not have the halakhic status of brothers. No yichus exists between the non-Jewish father and his sons.⁹Rishonim raise a number of questions on this statement regarding the lack of yichus of non-Jews. 1) Kiddushin 17b states that, according to Torah law, non-Jewish children inherit their parents. This suggests that the Torah does acknowledge non-Jewish lineage? 2) The same conclusion can be drawn from the Gemara’s discussion regarding the obligation of procreation for a father who converts after bearing children (Yevamot 62). Rav Yochanan states that one fulfills the mitzvah through children born even prior to conversion while Resh Lakish believes that the rule that a convert is considered born anew generates a new status that requires him to fulfill the mitzvah anew. Both opinions, however, acknowledge that lineage, yichus, does apply to non-Jews. How, then, can we understand Rava’s statement that non-Jews do not have yichus, and how might that serve as the basis for the view of RT?

Given our understanding of Rava’s statement that non-Jews do not have yichus, how might we explain RT’s extension of this principle?

Rabbeinu Tam and Rivam
Working backwards from the Rivam’s response to RT cited in the Tosafot, we can better understand RT’s view and the issue that divides them. In response to RT, Rivam writes,

דזרעיה דעובד כוכבים הוא דאפקריה רחמנא לענין חייס אבל ביאת דעובד כוכבים לא אפקריה.

…because the children of non-Jews have been dispossessed regarding lineage but the sexual act of non-Jews has not been dispossessed.

Rivam questions the equation of RT: adultery concerns the sexual act and is about religious morals; lineage is another matter, rooted in biology and blood lines, and affecting categories such as inheritance. The fact that non-Jews cannot create family with a Jewish woman should not weaken the severity of the sexual violation in the adulterous act.

RT disagrees precisely on this point. Apparently, RT views the arayot prohibitions as rooted within the endogamous community. In other words, the commitment to endogamous marriage, to marrying within the Jewish community, is assumed. The arayot laws are not directed toward ensuring that Jews marry within their own community. However, within that endogamous commitment, the arayot laws are designed to maintain the boundaries of distinct Jewish families. In this sense, Jews are exogamous, marrying outside of their own families. The arayot laws determine who in the Jewish community is considered in and outside of a particular Jewish family. In this sense, arayot, Jewish marriage, and family are mutually defining concepts. The Mishnah in Kiddushin (3:12) will help ground this principle more fully.

The Mishnah details the relationship between marriage, sexual sin, and mamzerut through four principles.¹⁰Tannaim debated these halakhot and this Mishnah establishes the halakha that capital and extirpation violations are considered arayot. The text of the Mishnah reads:
כל מקום שיש קדושין ואין עברה הולד הולך אחר הזכר. ואיזה זו כהנת לויה וישראלית שנשאו לכהן וללוי ולישראל. וכל מקום שיש קדושין ויש עברה הולד הולך אחר הפגום. ואיזו זו אלמנה לכהן גדול גרושה וחלוצה לכהן הדיוט ממזרת ונתינה לישראל בת ישראל לממזר ולנתין. וכל מי שאין לה עליו קדושין אבל יש לה על אחרים קדושין הולד ממזר. ואיזה זה הבא על אחת מכל העריות שבתורה. וכל מי שאין לה לא עליו ולא על אחרים קדושין הולד כמותה. ואיזה זה ולד שפחה ונכרית.
For our purposes, we will focus on the last two. The third principle teaches that when sex occurs between two people who are eligible for Jewish marriage in general, but not with each other, the child of such a relationship is a mamzer a child with the blemish (מום-mum) of the outsider (זר-zar). The fourth principle teaches that the child who is a product of sex between two people who are not eligible for Jewish marriage at all is not a mamzer and carries the status of the mother. The Mishnah lists two cases, that of a non-Jewish mother and of a mother who is a female slave.

The Mishnah conspicuously does not discuss the case of a non-Jewish man who has relations with a Jewish woman. This case is subject to dispute in the Gemara. Halakha follows the view that “עכו״ם ועבד הבא על בת ישראל הולד כשר,” the child of a non-Jewish man and a Jewish woman is legitimate and not a mamzer. The Gemara in Yevamot 45b explains the rationale for this rule, following the logic of the Mishnah in Kiddushin: since marriage is not possible between a non-Jewish man and a Jewish woman, the child is not a mamzer. This rule describes a relationship between 1) the halakhic possibility of Jewish marriage for these partners, 2) the arayot rules, and 3) the illegitimacy of offspring. We intuit that the idea of the Jewish family is the hub of these issues.

The Rashba (Yevamot 45b) offers a solution to this question. He describes that his teachers were puzzled as to why the child of a non-Jewish man and a Jewish woman is not a mamzer: if the offspring of two people who are eligible for Jewish marriage in general but not in this particular instance is a mamzer, shouldn’t we say that this is a fortiori the case with offspring of two people who are not eligible for Jewish marriage at all (a Jew and a non-Jew)? Rashba responds:

אני אומר כי יש ליישבה יפה דמאן דמכשר ה”ק ע”כ ליכא למיתלי בתפיסת קדושין אלא במי שיש לו קדושין בעלמא דכיון דאית ליה קדושין באחריני והכא לית ליה אלמא משום חומרא דערוה זו הוא והויא לה לגבי כאשת אב. אבל עכו”ם ועבד הא דלא תפסי להו קדושי בבת ישראל דלמא לאו משום חומרא דערוה אלא דאינהו לאו בני קדושי נינהו ואפילו בבת מינן כנ”ל.

I say there is a proper answer. The one who says the offspring is legitimate intended to say: We must not consider kiddushin to take hold, except for with someone for whom there can actually be kiddushin. Since there would be kiddushin with another man and here (with a non-Jew) there is no kiddushin, we see that this (the prohibition of arayot) is because of the severity of ervah, just as the case of a step-mother. But, kiddushin between a gentile or slave and a Jewish girl does not take hold at all, perhaps not because of the strictness of ervah but because they are not even able to do kiddushin at all, even to a Jewish girl.

The Rashba suggests that the category of arayot is specifically linked to transgressing the lines of Jewish marriage for Jews who are able to marry. Those who are outside of the realm of Jewish marriage entirely are also outside the realm of arayot. Jewish marriage, arayot, and mamzerut laws are intertwined.¹¹The Rashba cites a textual variant from R. Hai Gaon:
אבל לרב האיי גאון ז”ל נמצא בתשובה (מובא ברמב”ן) אנחנא הכין גריסנא מאן דמכשר סבר כאשת אב מה אשת אב שזרעו מיוחס אחריו הולד ממזר לאפוקי האי שאין זרעו מיוחס אחריו והולד כשר והאי לישנא הוא בריר טעמיה ע”כ (ועיין שאילתות שם). ויש לי להקשות להאי גירסא דבשלמא עבד אין זרעו מיוחס אחריו דהוקש לחמור אבל עכו”ם זרעו מיוחס אחריו הוא כדאמרינן לקמן בפרק הבא על יבמתו (יבמות סב א) ולכולי עלמא מיהא בגיותן אית להו חייס בלאדן בן בלאדן. וניחא לי דבבא על בת ישראל אינו מיוחס אחריו דבן בתך הבא מן העכו”ם קרוי בנך.

Rabbi Soloveitchik explains that the Gemarot in Kiddushin and Yevamot are teaching that family is not established purely through biology, blood lines, or sexual acts. Family is a microcosm of the society; the society’s values are built and transmitted through family. Therefore, societies are able to determine the legal parameters and the officially recognized definition of family. Those parameters begin with marriage. As Rabbi Soloveitchik explains the Gemara, Jewish marriage and Jewish family require a man and woman who are both members of the Jewish people.¹² Cited by R. Herschel Schachter, Eretz Hatzvi, p. 112. A non-Jew cannot marry a Jew and cannot join a Jewish family without converting to Judaism. In turn, arayot violations are specific to people who are eligible for Jewish marriage in general, for the combining of families in other instances but who are not eligible to marry each other – incest and adultery, for example.

Understood in this way, we can explain the debate between RT and the Rivam in the following manner. For RT, giluy arayot is not primarily about sexual sin in the sense of giving in to one’s sexual drives, nor is it about sex as an act of personal, physical, or spiritual transgression or an expansion of the rodef principle. Arayot are primarily about establishing the contours and parameters of the Jewish family of Knesset Yisrael.¹³ See Dov Berkovits, Teachings for Life from the Pages of the Talmud, Nashim (Koren Publishing, 2014), 569-578 [Hebrew] The Jewish family is exogamous in one sense and endogamous in another. Jews may not marry within one’s own family; marriage is defined as members of distinct families joining their families together through the act of marriage. והלכה והיתה לאיש אחר – לאחרים ולא” לקרובים.” However the Jewish family is endogamous in not recognizing the possibility of marriage between Jew and non-Jew.

The severity of the arayot derives from the importance that Judaism places on the social structure of the Jewish family. The specific cases that constitute the arayot shape and establish the contours for conjoining distinct Jewish families through marriage; transgressing those lines disturbs the structure of Jewish family. According to RT, sex with a non-Jewish man is not in the category of arayot because marriage between a Jew and a non-Jew is not a halakhic possibility and, therefore, Rava’s statement (Yevamot 98a) that the non-Jewish man does not have paternity of the child is, at its core, connected to the construction of the idea of Jewish marriage and family. The twins born to a non-Jewish father are not halakhic siblings because they are not members of what Judaism defines as family.

Following this line of thinking, Jewish marriage is not just about love, and paternity is not just about biology. Both are elements in the construction of the Jewish family. For RT, therefore, sex between a Jewish woman and non-Jewish man is “merely” sexual sin for which one is not obligated to surrender one’s life. For Rivam, arayot is the severity of the ethical violation of adulterous or incestuous sex. This ethical transgression is the same whether the partner is Jewish or not.

Although Chazal’s interpretation of the verse in Yechezkel remains challenging for the contemporary mindset ¹⁴The plain meaning of the verse in its context refers to the animal-like sexual qualities of the Babylonian and Egyptian men. The verse is a critique of the lusting of the Jewish people and less a comment on non-Jewish men., it is, according to Rava and RT, a reference to the endogamous nature of Judaism and the structure that this places on Jewish marriage and family. While some might find that idea troubling as well, it is trouble of a different sort, one with which we must contend when we think about Jewish marriage and family today.

Considered from this perspective, this makhloket opens a space to explore the definition of marriage in general, the idea of Jewish marriage in particular, and its centrality in defining the Jewish family. The definition and concept of marriage has been at the center of the culture wars in the United States for the last several decades. What does marriage mean? What defines it? What is the purpose of marriage? In the contemporary debate, one view sees marriage as a loving, emotional bond between two partners. According to this view, marriage is an expression of deep love and commitment between two partners. Any two people have the right to declare that the intensity of their love, and mutual care should be expressed through the marital bond. A second view understands marriage as extending, by definition, beyond the two partners to their children. Marriage is in the service of building a family.¹⁵ Sherif Girgis, Ryan T. Anderson, and Robert P. George, What Is Marriage? (Encounter Books, 2012) distinguish between two views of marriage, which they term the conjugal and the revisionist. See pages 1-6; 37-52. The issues raised here relate to and impact our understanding of the laws of mishkav zachar as well as same-sex marriage. Following the logic of this argument, a leniency regarding yehareig ve’al ya’avor would translate into a stringency regarding same-sex marriage (or the reverse, depending on your perspective). These issues are beyond the scope of this paper. It is a union that calls for permanent and exclusive commitment to both partner and family. These two views have distinct conceptions of the purpose of marriage and, consequently, the parameters of what types of relationships can be bonded through marriage.

We can gain insight into the debate between RT and Rivam by thinking about it against the backdrop of the contemporary marriage debate. Although Jewish marriage does not neatly fall into one of these two camps, the Mishnah in Kiddushin (as understood by Rashba), and the view of RT (as explained by Rabbi Soloveitchik) support the idea that Jewish marriage is defined by factors that extend beyond the love and commitment shared by two individuals. Not every set of partners with children qualifies as a Jewish family bonded through marriage. Jewish marriage has a particular set of parameters: it is a halakhic-social construction to support the continuity of Knesset Yisrael through exclusive commitment between a Jewish man and a Jewish woman in order to build a family and ensure the continuity of the Jewish people through the transmission of Torah, mitzvot, and shared values through the structure of family. Following this reasoning, a non-Jewish man cannot legally marry and create a family with a Jewish woman. If this is the case, suggests RT, a sexual transgression of this nature is not a violation of gilui arayot. Since it does not jeopardize the integrity of the Jewish family, martyrdom is not required in this circumstance.

Returning to the classroom
In sharing this explanation of RT, I am not proposing that we teach a definitive Jewish understanding of marriage based on this opinion in Tosafot. I am also aware that the book by Girgis, Anderson, and George cited above derives from a particular side of the marriage culture wars in America. I do not aim to neatly pick one side in that debate. I do, however, feel a sense of achievement if the makhloket between RT and Rivam, and the sources upon which they are based, is able to broaden our thinking about the possible reasons for the severity of the arayot and the nature of Jewish marriage and family; that a careful reading of the sources, determination to make those sources accessible to our contemporary understanding, incorporation of existing lomdus and the integration of contemporary debate can all come together to enrich our understanding of a challenging text.

For the teacher, the need for a pedagogical decision remains. This material must certainly be pared down for the high school classroom. The teacher might still decide to skip this segment. Teaching, as many have noted, requires an act of tzimtzum, a contraction. Not all that is learned is passed along to the student. The teacher must carefully select the elements and the sources that are key to student understanding. That is the work of Lee Shulman’s pedagogical content knowledge. ¹⁶ In Lee Shulman’s words, pedagogical content knowledge (PCK) is a “special amalgam of content and pedagogy that is uniquely the province of teachers, their own special form of professional understanding…It represents the blending of content and pedagogy into an understanding of how particular topics, problems, or issues are organized, represented and adapted to the diverse interests and abilities of learners and presented for instruction. Pedagogical content knowledge is the category most likely to distinguish the understanding of the content specialist from that of the pedagogue.” Shulman, L. S., “Knowledge and Teaching: Foundations of the New Reform,” Harvard Educational Review 57 (1987): 1-22.

In my own classroom, once I arrived at and committed to this reading of RT, I condensed the content in the following manner. We read RT’s view and allow the questions to naturally arise as we reflect on his idea. In response to student questions, I suggest that we should learn the Gemara in Yevamot cited by RT. Students learned that non-Jewish siblings who convert – even twins – are halakhically not considered siblings. What are possible ways to explain this idea? Rabbi Soloveitchik’s explanation of Jewish marriage and family provides an entry point. Depending on the class, I might include the Gemara and the Rashba cited above¹⁷ P. 10-11. to further fortify the relationship between the arayot prohibitions and the institutions of Jewish marriage and family. With this background, we can engage the RT-Rivam debate in a fashion that can serve as a memorable learning experience for students.

• 1
  Rambam, Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah 5:1.
• 2
  The present paper should be read with these goals in mind. The essays in this volume, for example, are not designed as classic chiddushei Torah. There is also no claim of comprehensiveness. The purpose of this writing is to highlight a small text of the Gemara, highlight the anticipated content-related questions that will be raised by our students, and suggest our best path for teaching that text, using Rishonim, Lomdus, and academic resources to accomplish that task.
• 3
  See Rabbi Herschel (Tzvi) Schachter, Eretz Hatzevi (Genesis Jerusalem Press, 1992), 114.
• 4
  Rabbeinu Asher, Ketuvot 1:4.
• 5
  It is possible to explain that this act simply does not carry halakhic standing. If this is so in the subsequent case cited by RT regarding the non Jewish adulterer who now converted to Judaism the woman should be permitted to return to her current husband or to marry the non-Jew after conversion. This suggestion is complicated by the fact that the very same paragraph in the Shitah Mekubetzet notes that while the act is not considered intercourse regarding the non-Jew the woman herself is nonetheless prohibited from returning to her husband after relations with the non-Jew. This suggests that an illicit sexual act did indeed take place! Note the variations in the two Tosafot as well as the Rosh: דלא שייך למימר אחד לבעל ואחד לבועל (Tosafot Ketuvot Rosh) versus דלא שייך למימר אחד לבועל (Tosafot Sanhedrin Shitah Mekubetzet Ketuvot 3b). In Eretz Hatzvi p. 114 note 6 Rav Schachter distinguishes between a ma’aseh bi’ah an act of intercourse and a ma’aseh ishut a marital act. Sex with a non-Jewish man does not carry the status of halakhic intercourse but does carry the status of a marital act. Therefore the woman is prohibited to her husband but is not prohibited to a non-Jewish man should he convert because the act does not qualify as adultery. Students (and many adults) will not grasp the distinction between ma’aseh bi’ah and ma’aseh ishut without some effort on the teacher’s part to translate those concepts into more accessible terms. In the explanation below I suggest that adultery and mamzerut are not the result of illicit sex alone but of illicit sex that tampers with the Jewish structure of marriage and family. Following that reasoning one could use the terms in the reverse fashion. Sex with a non-Jewish man is a ma’aseh bi’ah but is not a ma’aseh ishut since marriage with a non-Jewish man is not possible. Since it is precisely a problematic ma’aseh ishut that generates arayot and mamzerut that does not apply regarding the non-Jew. However the adulteress is prohibited to her husband after relations with a non-Jewish man because it is considered a ma’aseh bi’ah and a lack of fidelity to her husband. See below
• 6
  The text of Chiddushei HaRan:
  חוץ מע״א וג״ע וש״ד. לפי שאלו העבירות הם חמורות מכולן אמרו חכמים יהרג ואל יעבור. עבודת אלילים טעמא מבואר שלא יכפור בהקב״ה. ושפיכת דמים ג״כ שלא יציל עצמו בממון של חבירו. גילוי עריות נמי מפני שיש בהם פגם שהרי מצילין אותה בנפשו ואם כן בדין הוא שיהרג ואל יעבור. ולפי טעם זה אם יאמרו לו בא על בהמה או תיהרג כיון שאין שם פגם יעבור ואל יהרג שהרי למדו כל עריות מנערה המאורסה להצילן בנפשן ואין הבהמה בכלל ואין צריך לומר חייבי לאווין כאלמנה לכהן גדול. אבל אין לנו לחדש דין זה שלא פירשוהו חכמים ועוד שאין טעם יהרג ואל יעבור מפני שמצילין אותן בנפשן דהרי ע״א קיימא לן דאין מצילין אותו בנפשו ויהרג ואל יעבור ולפיכך אפשר דאפילו בא על בהמה אמרינן יהרג ואל יעבור כיון שיש בה מיתת בית דין.
• 7
  The Ran attempts to delineate the parameters of martyring oneself and expresses uncertainty regarding the transgression of bestiality. On the one hand bestiality is included in the list of sexual prohibitions in Vayikra. And yet suggests the Ran perhaps just as one may not kill a perpetrator to prevent him from violating bestiality (אין מצילין אותן בנפשן) perhaps there is also no obligation to surrender one’s own life for this type of sexual line crossing. While the Ran chooses to be stringent on this question he does acknowledge the possibility that not all capital sexual transgressions listed in Vayikra are in the category of arayot for which one must martyr themselves. He entertains the possibility that the obligation to give one’s life is related to the obligation to take the life of a pursuer and save the pursued in similar circumstances establishing the rule as an extension of the rodef principle. This possibility decouples sexual transgression from arayot. Not all sexual sin is arayot.
• 8
  See Even Yisrael on the Rambam Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah 5: ונראה לומר דהנה יש לעיין בעיקר דינא דיהרג ואל יעבור בהני ג’ עבירות. אי הוא חיובא גם להרוג את עצמו קודם שיעבור או דנימא דהוא חיובא להניח להרוג את עצמו ע”י העכו”ם אבל עליו בעצמו אין חיוב להרוג את עצמו ופשוט דזה תלוי בעיקר יסוד חיובא דיהרג ואל יעבור דעי’ בחידושי הר”נ בסנהדרין דף ע”ד כתב וז”ל חוץ מע”א וג”ע ושפיכות דמים לפי שאלו העבירות הן חמורות מכלם אמרו חכמים יהרג ואל יעבור ע”ז טעמא מבואר שלא יכפור בהקב”ה. ושפיכות דמים ג”כ שלא יציל נפשו בדמו של חבירו ג”ע נמי מפני שיש בהם פגם שהרי מצילין אותה בנפשו וא”כ בדין הוא שיהרג ואל יעבור ולפי טעם זה אם יאמר לו בא על הבהמה או תיהרג כיון שאין שם פגם יעבור ואל יהרג שהרי למדו כל העריות מנערה המאורסה להצילן בנפשו ואין הבהמה בכלל וכו’ אבל אין לנו לחדש דין זה שלא פרשוהו חכמים ועוד שאין טעם יהרג ואל יעבור מפני שמצילין אותן בנפשו דהרי ע”ז קיי”ל דאין מצילין אותן בנפשו ויהרג ואל יעבור ולפיכך אפשר דאפי’ בא על הבהמה אמרינן יהרג ואל יעבור כיון שיש בה מיתת ב”ד וכו’ עיי”ש הרי מבואר בר”נ דיש לפרש דכל דינא דיהרג ואל יעבור הוא משום דינא דמצילין אותו בנפשו ועי’ מנחת חינוך מצוה רצ”ו שכתב דבאנסוהו להרוג חבירו נתן להצילו בנפשו וכל ישראל הרואה ויכול להציל את חבירו בנפשו מחויב להציל ולהרוג אותו אף שאינו חייב מיתה על ההריגה היינו לאחר שהרג אבל קודם שהרג הוי רודף עיי”ש. והנפ”מ הוא אם אונסין אותו לבוא על הבהמה אי אית בי’ דינא דיהרג ואל יעבור.
  
• 9
  Rishonim raise a number of questions on this statement regarding the lack of yichus of non-Jews. 1) Kiddushin 17b states that, according to Torah law, non-Jewish children inherit their parents. This suggests that the Torah does acknowledge non-Jewish lineage? 2) The same conclusion can be drawn from the Gemara’s discussion regarding the obligation of procreation for a father who converts after bearing children (Yevamot 62). Rav Yochanan states that one fulfills the mitzvah through children born even prior to conversion while Resh Lakish believes that the rule that a convert is considered born anew generates a new status that requires him to fulfill the mitzvah anew. Both opinions, however, acknowledge that lineage, yichus, does apply to non-Jews. How, then, can we understand Rava’s statement that non-Jews do not have yichus, and how might that serve as the basis for the view of RT?
• 10
  Tannaim debated these halakhot and this Mishnah establishes the halakha that capital and extirpation violations are considered arayot. The text of the Mishnah reads:
  כל מקום שיש קדושין ואין עברה הולד הולך אחר הזכר. ואיזה זו כהנת לויה וישראלית שנשאו לכהן וללוי ולישראל. וכל מקום שיש קדושין ויש עברה הולד הולך אחר הפגום. ואיזו זו אלמנה לכהן גדול גרושה וחלוצה לכהן הדיוט ממזרת ונתינה לישראל בת ישראל לממזר ולנתין. וכל מי שאין לה עליו קדושין אבל יש לה על אחרים קדושין הולד ממזר. ואיזה זה הבא על אחת מכל העריות שבתורה. וכל מי שאין לה לא עליו ולא על אחרים קדושין הולד כמותה. ואיזה זה ולד שפחה ונכרית.
  
• 11
  The Rashba cites a textual variant from R. Hai Gaon:
  אבל לרב האיי גאון ז”ל נמצא בתשובה (מובא ברמב”ן) אנחנא הכין גריסנא מאן דמכשר סבר כאשת אב מה אשת אב שזרעו מיוחס אחריו הולד ממזר לאפוקי האי שאין זרעו מיוחס אחריו והולד כשר והאי לישנא הוא בריר טעמיה ע”כ (ועיין שאילתות שם). ויש לי להקשות להאי גירסא דבשלמא עבד אין זרעו מיוחס אחריו דהוקש לחמור אבל עכו”ם זרעו מיוחס אחריו הוא כדאמרינן לקמן בפרק הבא על יבמתו (יבמות סב א) ולכולי עלמא מיהא בגיותן אית להו חייס בלאדן בן בלאדן. וניחא לי דבבא על בת ישראל אינו מיוחס אחריו דבן בתך הבא מן העכו”ם קרוי בנך.
  
• 12
  Cited by R. Herschel Schachter, Eretz Hatzvi, p. 112.
• 13
  See Dov Berkovits, Teachings for Life from the Pages of the Talmud, Nashim (Koren Publishing, 2014), 569-578 [Hebrew]
• 14
  The plain meaning of the verse in its context refers to the animal-like sexual qualities of the Babylonian and Egyptian men. The verse is a critique of the lusting of the Jewish people and less a comment on non-Jewish men.
• 15
  Sherif Girgis, Ryan T. Anderson, and Robert P. George, What Is Marriage? (Encounter Books, 2012) distinguish between two views of marriage, which they term the conjugal and the revisionist. See pages 1-6; 37-52. The issues raised here relate to and impact our understanding of the laws of mishkav zachar as well as same-sex marriage. Following the logic of this argument, a leniency regarding yehareig ve’al ya’avor would translate into a stringency regarding same-sex marriage (or the reverse, depending on your perspective). These issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
• 16
  In Lee Shulman’s words, pedagogical content knowledge (PCK) is a “special amalgam of content and pedagogy that is uniquely the province of teachers, their own special form of professional understanding…It represents the blending of content and pedagogy into an understanding of how particular topics, problems, or issues are organized, represented and adapted to the diverse interests and abilities of learners and presented for instruction. Pedagogical content knowledge is the category most likely to distinguish the understanding of the content specialist from that of the pedagogue.” Shulman, L. S., “Knowledge and Teaching: Foundations of the New Reform,” Harvard Educational Review 57 (1987): 1-22.
• 17
  P. 10-11.